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Rights-based management, such as the individual transferable quota (ITQ) system, is a popular approach for pursuing economic, social, and
environmental sustainability in fisheries, with a variety of outcomes. This variety appears to be explained by the contextual differences between
the targeted fisheries. By acknowledging that each fishery is unique, we need to apply holistic evaluationmethods to understand themechanisms
causing different outcomes in fisheries interventions. Here, we apply the realist evaluation (RE) approach to evaluate the ITQ system implemented
in the Finnish herring fishery. This study serves two purposes: () it outlines the realized outcomes of the Finnish management system in relation
to the expected outcomes and () it introduces the RE method to the field of fisheries management. Measured in economic terms, the results
indicate the newmanagement system to be a success, although the benefits aremore prominent for large-scale fishers. The context did not allow
small-scale fishers to reap the theorized benefits of the ITQ system, leading to a somewhatmore uncertain future for the sector. The RE approach
proved to be a useful tool, well-suited to the evaluation of fisheries management systems.
Keywords: Baltic Sea, context-mechanism-outcome, fisheries management, ITQ, large-scale fisheries, program theory, small-scale fisheries,
sustainability, TFC.
Introduction
Considering the importance of fish as a source of food in a future
where the global population is rising, it is vital to find environmen-
tally, economically, and socially sustainable management solutions
for fisheries. There have been several suggestions for how to do this,
and among them, rights-basedmanagement (RBM) is a popular ap-
proach (Cunningham, 2005). The core of RBM is the motivation
of fishers towards more sustainable operations by creating occupa-
tional exclusiveness without privatizing the resource stock (Grafton
et al., 2006). One prominent RBM approach is the individual trans-
ferable quota (ITQ) system, which utilizes economic incentives in
an effort to achieve sustainable fisheries (Arnason, 2009). Quotas
are considered as a commodity that gives the owner the right to
fish a certain proportion of the total allowable catch (TAC) for a
certain species, thus eliminating the “race to fish” and enhancing
economic performance (Birkenbach et al., 2017; Anderson et al.,
2019). Following the general recommendations of the EUCommon
Fisheries Policy (CFP; The European Parliament and the Council,
Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013, 2013) and to overcome the declin-
C© International Council for the Exploration of the Sea 2021. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
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ing economic efficiency (Guillen et al., 2018) of the fishing sector,
Finland introduced an ITQ system in 2017 for the management of
commercial herring, sprat, and salmon fisheries. The quota system
officially goes under the concept of transferable fishing concessions
(TFC), as proposed by the EuropeanCommission, where quotas are
revocable user rights rather than infinite property rights.
ITQs have been implemented in various fisheries worldwide, and
although common outcomes can be identified, a variety of out-
comes exists that appear to depend on the contextual variation.
To understand the causal mechanisms behind the nuances in in-
tervention outcomes, we need to apply ex-post evaluation methods
that integrate the ecological, social, economic, and governance di-
mensions of sustainability and combine themwith the local-specific
contexts. In the field of impact assessment (IA), with its tendency
for single impact evaluations, recent developments are redefining
the concept towards a more integrated approach, referred to as sus-
tainability impact assessment (SIA; Kumar et al., 2020). By integrat-
ing the main pillars of sustainability, SIA assesses policy alterna-
tives, attempting to evaluate the possible outcomes and recognizing
the short- and long-term impacts on sustainability. Malvarosa et al.
(2019) provide a useful guide on how to conduct SIAs in the context
of fisheries management interventions. The SIA approach can pro-
vide policy makers valuable information regarding policy options.
However, SIAs are advocated as an ex-ante approach rather than a
tool for ex-post evaluations.
A key factor for the success of any management intervention is
evaluation of the outcomes and subsequent system improvements.
For this purpose, we apply the realist evaluation (RE) approach
(Pawson and Tilley, 1997a). RE offers a structured tool for ex-post
evaluations of complex policy systems. It is a theory-driven ap-
proach that, like SIA, advocates the use of multiple data collection
methods and emphasizes stakeholder involvement. RE attempts to
refine the initial programme theory by identifyingwhether and how
an intervention worked in a certain setting. Herein lies the advan-
tage of the RE method, as RE does not simply answer whether a
programme works or not, but offers insights into “what worked
for whom in what circumstances and in what respects, and how?”
(Pawson and Tilley, 1997a). RE has gained momentum, especially
within the health field (Byng et al., 2005;Marchal et al., 2010), but is
yet to be utilized in natural resource management and policy plan-
ning.
This paper focuses on the Finnish herring fishery, as it is themost
important fishery in Finland, measured both in tons (92000 tons
in 2020) and value. Sprat is the second most caught species (13000
tons in 2020). Although this study focused on herring, both herring
and sprat catches are highly concentrated among the same small
number of fishers. The salmon fishery was excluded because the
background and issues linked to this fishery strongly differs from
the herring and sprat fisheries, and it was considered more fitting
as its own research topic. Unlike many other fisheries implement-
ing a quota system primarily to restore overfished fish stocks, the
Finnish herring stock biomass remained fairly stable from 2014 to
2021, except that the estimate for 2019 was the lowest since 1980
(ICES, 2021). As such, there is no reason to believe that the imple-
mentation of the ITQ systemwas a managerial response to the state
of the stock.
Here, we use the RE approach to evaluate the Finnish ITQ sys-
tem, explaining both the desired and less-desired outcomes of the
intervention. For data collection, we conducted stakeholder inter-
views and reviewed fisheries data gathered by the Finnish Natural
Resources Institute. In addition, we used the study of Kulmala et al.
(2007) to better understand the views of Finnish stakeholders re-
garding ITQs prior to the system’s implementation. By conducting
this study at this relatively early stage of the new management era
in Finland, our aims are to:
1. Evaluate the early stages of the Finnish ITQ system;
2. Identify stakeholder opinions and concerns, as well as recognize
management areas in need of further attention in the future; and
3. Present the RE method and test its usability in the field of fish-
eries management.
The herring fishery and its management in Finland
The Finnish herring fishery can be divided into (1) pelagic and deep
midwater trawling in state-owned waters and (2) coastal trap-net
fishing near spawning areas, whichmostly takes place during spring
in privately owned waters. Coastal trap-net fishing only accounts
for a small portion of the total herring catch, while the bulk, some
96% of the total catch in 2017 (Jounela et al., 2018), is caught by
the trawler fleet. The catch has been concentrated among a small
number of vessels, of which a large proportion have recently been
transferred to foreign owners (Natural Resource Institute, LUKE,
2019). An increasing number of landings take place in foreign ports,
mainly in Estonia, Denmark, and Sweden (some 20% of the her-
ring catch in 2020). Despite herring being one of the key commer-
cial catch species in the Baltic Sea, in Finland only a fraction of
the catch is sold for human consumption, while the bulk is used
as fodder for the fur industry and processed into fish oil and fish-
meal (Ignatius and Haapasaari, 2016; Pihlajamäki et al., 2018). The
number of workers within Finnish fisheries has steadily decreased
since the beginning of the 20th century. It is estimated that in 1901,
the number of commercial fishers was at least 20000 (Salmi, 2009a),
whereas in 2016 there were 1970 registered active commercial fish-
ers (Luonnonvarakeskus, 2021). The majority of these fishers are
employed part-time within the small-scale coastal fishery fleet, op-
erating with seasonal boundaries (Guillen et al., 2018). Although
the importance of fishing for the national economy of Finland has
diminished, it is still of relevance at the regional level (Virtanen et
al., 2001). Moreover, commercial fishing has socio-cultural value
(Salmi, 2009b; Ignatius et al., 2019).
Finland joining the EU in 1995 meant stricter regulation and
control of the fisheries through the implementation of the EUs CFP
(Salmi, 2012). The CFP implies that the TAC limits are decided at
the EU level, while each member state is responsible for the divi-
sion of the national quota and fishing rights (The European Par-
liament and the Council, Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013, 2013). In
Finland, prior to the ITQ system, the national quota for herring and
sprat was available for all registered commercial fishers. This system
promoted competition between fishers aiming to catch as much as
possible before the quota limit was reached, a situation often re-
ferred to as the “race to fish” or “Olympic fishing.” This frequently
forced fisheries managers to halt trawl fishing midseason, only to
be reopened during autumn (Maa- ja metsätalousministeriö, 2001,
2002). This was done primarily for two purposes: first, to ensure
a part of the quota for small-scale coastal fisheries (mainly trap-
net fishing focusing on spawning fish in early summer), and sec-
ond, to ensure that part of the quota was left for the winter season.
This management system was considered by many stakeholders in-
adequate for achieving economic, social, and environmental sus-
tainability (Kulmala et al., 2007), and Finnish fishers wished for a
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With the overall revenues in decline, a shift towards a quota-based
management systemhad long been discussed prior to the actual im-
plementation.
Finnish coastal fishers (mainly trap-net fishing) have recently
struggled with the growing populations of seals and black cor-
morants. Seals, in particular, are considered to cause economic
losses by destroying fishing equipment (Hansson et al., 2018; Svels
et al., 2019). Both seals and black cormorants also feed on herring,
although to what extent this impacts on the fishers’ catch is debated.
High emissions of persistent organic pollutants (POPs) around the
Baltic Sea in the 1960s and 1970s, and a subsequently high con-
tent of POPs, such as dioxins, in fatty fish species, led to restrictions
within the EU regarding the marketing of herring for human con-
sumption (Commission Regulation (EU) No 1259/2011, 2011). Al-
though, recent studies have shown a reduction in both dioxin levels
(Rantakokko et al., 2019) and the risks of dioxins in Baltic fish to
human health (Tuomisto et al., 2020), these restrictions may have
weakened the reputation of Baltic herring among consumers and af-
fected their marketability (Assmuth and Jalonen, 2006; Pihlajamäki
et al., 2018; Ignatius et al., 2019). Furthermore, in 2014, for political
reasons, Russia implemented restrictions on the country’s import
of fish products, thereby removing an important export market for
Finnish fishers. In an effort to increase the human consumption of
herring, it is nowadays being advertised both for its health benefits
and as an effective method for removing nutrients from the Baltic
Sea.
ITQs and the Finnish system
In the ITQ system, owning a quota represents the right to fish a pro-
portion of a certain fish species/population, thus not privatizing the
fish stock itself, which remains a common resource (Kronbak et al.,
2014).Quotas, which are shares of the national TAC, are allocated to
fishers, who can then use their rights to fish, lease the quota, or sell
their user-rights (Grainger and Costello, 2011). This allows fishers
to optimize their level of input in order to maximize their output,
leading to both allocative and technical efficiency (Grafton et al.,
2000). Here, economists emphasize the importance of creating se-
cure, durable, and tradeable ownership rights, with a long-enough-
time perspective (Havice, 2013). As such, the ITQ system guaran-
tees the quota holder a share of future catches, allowing the whole
fleet to make rational economic decisions, which optimizes the in-
dividual economic yield and reduces fleet overcapacity (Beddington
et al., 2007).With ITQs, fishers are financially rewarded for the pro-
ductivity of well-managed and sustainably fished stocks, and the in-
centive for overfishing and breaching quota limits is hence removed
(Emery et al., 2012). Since its first application in New Zealand (Bat-
stone and Sharp, 1999), the ITQ system has gained increasing ac-
ceptance and experienced a fair degree of success (Cunningham,
2005; Grafton et al., 2006; Beddington et al., 2007). However, it has
also faced criticism, predominantly regarding, but not limited to,
the social aspects (Copes, 1996; Copes and Charles, 2004; Olson,
2011), e.g. extensive quota concentration and price developments,
making the industry skewed and exclusive.
In 2017, Finland introduced an ITQ system in the herring, sprat,
and salmon fisheries. In the planning phase, the programme de-
signers sought practical experiences from other countries, such as
Iceland, Sweden, and Denmark. Representatives from these coun-
tries were invited to share their experiences of the system. Accord-
ing to the designers, this resulted in a programme consisting of
“a collection of the best properties from ITQ systems abroad” (M.
Hanstén, pers. comm.), designed to meet the requirements of the
Finnish fishery industry. In Finland (excluding the Åland islands),
fishers are under the jurisdiction of theMinistry of Agriculture and
Forestry, which is responsible for ITQ system design as well as the
implementation and allocation of quotas.
According to the designers of the Finnish quota system, themain
objective of the system was to improve the economic efficiency of
the fishing industry. The social and environmental aspects were also
regarded as important, but these were not separately mentioned in
the planning process. The designers believed that social and en-
vironmental benefits would be achieved in line with the ITQ the-
ory (Grafton, 1996). The Finnish ITQ system covers three species:
Baltic herring, sprat, and salmon. From here on, we will focus on
herring ITQs. The quota sizes were determined and allocated ac-
cording to the catch history, where the three best years of a 5-year
period were taken into account. Once granted an ITQ, the fisher
is obliged to utilize the quota received or risk losing it, in which
case the ITQ will fall back to the state to be reallocated. As a glob-
ally novel attribute for ITQ systems, Finland introduced a system
where 4% of the initial TAC was allocated to new actors (FINLEX
1048/2016, 2016). These “newcomer” quotas were distributed to
lure new actors into the industry, thus reducing the exclusiveness
and closedness of the system. These quotas were allocated for a 5-
year period for persons without a catch history, during which time
the fisher could acquire transferable rights from the market.
The law clearly stipulates that the quotas are considered as user
rights and that the resource is still owned by the Finnish state (FIN-
LEX 1048/2016, 2016). The difference between property rights and
user rights can also affect the quota holders’ perceived security of
the system, since in user rights nothing is owned and the future is
somewhat insecure in this respect (Grainger and Costello, 2011).
The user rights were initially distributed for a period of 10 years,
with the possibility of prolonging it by a period of 5 years at a time.
The rights will be re-evaluated every 5 years so that the fishers will
always have a 5- to 10-year time perspective (FINLEX 1048/2016,
2016). Thiswas decided in an effort to “hinder the quota prices from
skyrocketing” (quote from personal discussions).
In Finland, herring quotas were divided between the pelagic and
deep mid-water trawling fishery and the coastal trap-net fishery
(FINLEX 1048/2016, 2016). Coastal trap-net fishing mainly takes
place in private water areas, owned or leased by the fisher. Privately
owned waters, a relic from political decisions taken in 1766 when
Finland was part of Sweden, are a globally rare feature within ma-
rine fisheries management (Salmi and Varjopuro, 2001). The two
sectors were separated in an effort to protect small-scale coastal
fisheries (quote from personal discussions). It is, thus not possible
for a trap-net fishing company to transfer their quota rights to a
trawl fishing company. The annual quota can, however, be trans-
ferred, for instance if the coastal fisher still has quotas left after the
trap-net fishing season has ended (FINLEX 1048/2016, 2016). To
prevent extensive quota concentration, the law also restricts a single
actor from holdingmore than 20% of the national quota for herring
and sprat, a rule applied for both the large- and small-scale sectors
(FINLEX 1048/2016, 2016). In 2018, the Finnish fishery law was
complemented with two clauses according to the EU’s CFP Articles
15.8 and 15.9 (The European Parliament and the Council, Regula-
tion (EU) No 1380/2013, 2013). At the individual level, Article 15.8
allows up to 9% of the bycatch to be registered as the target species,
which in practice allows herring fishers in Finland to register sprat
caught as bycatch as part of their individual herring quota. At the
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Figure 1. The RE framework.
tional quota by a maximum of 10%, given that the same proportion
is deducted from the quota for the following year. This is seen as a
way to stabilize fluctuations between yearly quotas, thus enhancing
the operating conditions for the fisheries.
Theoretical framework: RE
RE is a theory-driven evaluation approach that attempts to answer
the question “What works for whom in what circumstances and
in what respect, and how?” (Pawson and Tilley, 1997a). The RE
process attempts to evaluate an intervention based on the context,
mechanism, and outcome configurations (CMOc), or C + M = O.
In the RE approach, an intervention is considered a theory, which
is a product of its creators’ imagination of how the programme
creates change, i.e. outcomes or a pattern of outcomes (O). How-
ever, the fate of a programme ultimately depends on the perception
of its practitioners and participants. The mechanisms (M) do not
therefore describe the components of a programme, but rather how
the subjects choose to interpret and act upon the given resources.
These mechanisms also operate in certain conditions or contexts
(C), which may or may not allow changes to occur (Pawson and
Tilley, 1997b; Salter and Kothari, 2014).
Programmes are always implemented in pre-existing social con-
textswith their own rules, norms, and values, which are all crucial in
explaining the myriad of outcomes or outcome patterns following
the implementation (Pawson and Tilley, 1997b). The RE approach
sees both the material and social world as “real”, i.e. anything that
produces real effects is by definition real, but the perceived real-
ity is always influenced by the human brain and “final knowledge”
cannot therefore exist (Westhorp, 2014). However, the RE approach
believes the real world to produce boundaries for what is reason-
able to believe, and as such, over time, knowledge can be improved
(Westhorp et al., 2011). As RE does not ask one single question,
it consequently does not rely on one single outcome. In fact, RE
starts with a theory and ends with a refined theory (Pawson and
Tilley, 1997a), contributing to an ongoing theoretical development.
In this sense, the evaluation never answers the question of whether
an intervention works or not but will give decision-makers a better
understanding of what worked for whom in what circumstances.
Methods
For the purpose of this paper, and based on the RE theory (Pawson
and Tilley, 1997a), Figure 1 presents the four-step framework used
in our evaluation process. Each step is described below.
The first stage of RE is involved in identifying the initial pro-
gramme theory. This was done in two steps. First, by using Google
Scholar to find relevant articles, we reviewed a number of ITQ im-
plementation cases around the world. This was done to gain an un-
derstanding of the challenges associated with the introduction of
the ITQ system, to identify possible outcome patterns, and to con-
template on the possible effects in the Finnish context. Second, the
first author co-conducted two interviews with the two developers
of the Finnish ITQ system, clarifying the implementation process
and the expected outcomes of the programme. Based on this, we
elicited the initial programme theory.
In the second stage, we conducted stakeholder interviews to
identify the mechanisms and to understand the context wherein
they operate (Manzano, 2016). A total of 15 stakeholders were in-
terviewed during the autumn of 2018, including managers (1), re-
searchers (1), representatives of fishermen’s unions (3), other non-
profit organizations (2), fish processors (2), commercial trawl (3),
and trap-net (3) fishers. All the groups were analysed separately.
However, in the quotes provided in the result section, we grouped
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Table 1. Initial programme theory: key elements and hypothesized outcomes.
Elements Impact Hypothesized outcome
Individual quotas (user rights) Secure catch proportions. Increases efficiency. Economically more stable companies.
Increased profitability.
Quota and user right transfers (quota
market)
Optimization of quota distribution. The market
assigns a monetary value to quotas and user
rights—incentive to exit the industry.
Increased flexibility. Reduced fleet size
(aimed predominantly at the trawl fleet).
Newcomer quota Reduces exclusivity. Easy access for new actors. Lures new actors into the industry (mainly
to the small-scale sector).
Separate small- & large-scale user rights Hinders the concentration of user rights in large
trawl companies.
Secures the continuation of the small-scale
sector. Allows both sectors to thrive.
Social & environmental factors Better operational environment. Removes
incentive to overfish.
More secure employment and safer working
conditions. Sustainable fishing.
tions, and fish processors into “Interest group” to ensure that the
identities of the interviewees representing small stakeholder groups
will not be revealed. Stakeholders were selected based on their role
and interests in the Finnish herring and sprat fisheries. As the fish-
ery scene in Finland is rather small, the 15 interviewees represented
a large proportion of those who know the ITQ system well. For in-
stance, only twomanagers planned thewhole ITQ system and, since
their opinions and views appeared very similar in the initial discus-
sions, we interviewed only one of them. Similarly, as ourmain focus
was on the stakeholders’ perceptions of the outcomes of ITQ, we
interviewed only one researcher. The perspective of the researcher
was, however, considered important in comparing opinions of the
implementation process and expected outcomes. No representa-
tives of environmental NGOs, with knowledge about the Finnish
ITQ system, were available for this study. However, we did not con-
sider this a problem, as in Finland the herring stocks are consid-
ered to be fished at a sustainable level. The interviewed fishers rep-
resented different coastal areas of Finland. The semi-structured in-
terviews consisted of 17 questions regarding the Finnish ITQ sys-
tem, as well as the prospects for the industry. All interviews were
audio-recorded and transcribed. The transcripts were entered into
Atlas.ti and coded using a thematic analysis approach (Miles and
Huberman, 1994; Boyatzis, 1998; Friese, 2019). In addition to the
interviews, data related to the implementation and outcomes of the
ITQ systemwere retrieved from the open data source of the Finnish
Natural Resources Institutes (LUKE).
In stage three, we analysed the collected data through threemain
steps:
1. Based on the initial program theory, we categorized the data by
identifying significant elements of ITQs, the actors, or stake-
holder groups, as well as the context, mechanisms, and out-
comes.
2. In the subsequent rounds of the analysis, the themes and pat-
terns were refined, identifying various outcome patterns. This
resulted in a total of five groups of outcomes: (1) individual quo-
tas (user rights), (2) quota and user right transfers (quota mar-
ket), (3) newcomer quotas, (4) separate small- and large-scale
user rights, and (5) social and environmental factors
3. In the final step, themechanisms and contextual factorswere fur-
ther analysed in relation to the outcomes. The resulting CMO
configurations determine themost plausible explanations for the
recognized patterns of outcomes, i.e. explaining in this context,
this mechanism was triggered by these actors, generating these
outcomes.
In the fourth stage of the RE, the CMO configurations were syn-
thesized, offering plausible explanations for the actual outcomes
(refined theory) in comparison with the assumed outcomes (initial
program theory). It is not in the nature of RE to present universal
truths and recommendations regarding programme theories. In-
stead, RE offers insights for decision-makers into how the updated
theory may help to tune the system in the desired direction.
Results
Based on the programme theory, Table 1 presents the key elements
of the system as well as their hypothesized outcomes.
Context-mechanisms-outcomes
Based on the programme theory and the hypothesized outcomes,
we here present five different CMO configurations:
1. Individual quotas (user rights)
2. Quota and user right transfers (quota market)
3. Newcomer quotas
4. Separate small- and large-scale user rights
5. Social and environmental factors
1. Individual quotas (user rights)
Context
The atmosphere of the Finnish fishing sector favoured the imple-
mentation of the ITQ system. Many fishers wished for the system
to be implemented, and some of them had experience of ITQs from
abroad. The industry was economically in a downfall and in need
ofmodernization, at least on themanagement side. The race-to-fish
phenomenon was considered to trigger a negative spiral in the in-
dustry. Trawlers and trap-net fishers who operated in different envi-
ronments, however, perceived the ITQ system and its acceptability
differently.
Mechanisms
Most of the interviewed stakeholders were of the opinion that ITQs
are the right management system for Finnish fisheries. Those op-
posing the system were fishers targeting herring mainly for human
consumption. A common perception among trap-net fishers was
that they should have been left outside the individual quota system.
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own share of the national quota, which would have been open to all
registered small-scale fishers. A couple of reasons were mentioned:
first, ITQs were considered to hinder up-scaling, since there is of-
ten a lack of financing possibilities to buy more quotas, and second,
small-scale fishers are more vulnerable to reductions in the TAC,
also reducing the number of high-quality fish caught for the hu-
man consumption market. The managers had considered that in-
cluding small-scale fishers in the system would secure the contin-
uation of small-scale coastal fisheries, e.g. fishers targeting herring
for human consumption. Most stakeholders agreed that by separat-
ing the quotas for trawl and trap-net fisheries, and controlling the
transferability between them, the continuity of small-scale fisheries
had successfully been secured.
A general assumption among the interviewees was that the quota
systemwill have a positive economic effect on individual fishing en-
terprises and the industry as a whole. Some of the positive factors
mentioned were improved flexibility, cost-efficiency, and improved
planning and cooperation possibilities. However, some stakehold-
ers pointed out that the globalmarket prices for fodder, the develop-
ment of the Finnish fur industry, and the recent loss of the Russian
market also affected the economic performance of fisheries. The in-
terviewed fishers targeting fish for human consumption considered
the quotas to have a negative impact on their economy:
“Now I never know if I can rent [quotas] from someone or where the quotas
are going… so it [Finnish national quota] might go up in 2020, what if I buy
quotas now, then I will have too much, and then the state will take it back if
I cannot fish it”—Commercial fisher
One stakeholder brought up the issues linked with the private
waters and ITQ:
“…a clear limiting factor [the quotas] … I have bought my own equipment,
my own water areas and I am doing everything myself, then suddenly this
sets a limit for how much I can fish…”—Commercial fisher
Due to the extensive race to fish, herring trawling has previously
been concentrated at the beginning of the year, whereas ITQ allows
fishers to decide whether to save catches for later in the year. Dur-
ing summer, warmer weather makes catching and storing fishmore
labourious, yet some interviewees considered that an increase in
demand and higher fish prices would enable the technical devel-
opments required for extending the fishing of herring for human
consumption to the summer months. The concentration of quotas
in larger actors was considered as a sign that the system is working
properly, and was by no one mentioned to induce negative social
consequences. However, quota concentration had long occurred
prior to the implementation of ITQs, and as such, this develop-
ment, and possible negative consequences, was difficult to blame on
the system per se. The reduced race to fish was appreciated among
all stakeholders, highlighting the possibility for long-term planning
and increased flexibility. Generally, attitude towards the future of
the industry had slightly improved along with the new system and
signs of increased cooperation could be seen. The trap-net fishers
had not noticed any significant quota concentration within their
community. Some fishers had given up because they had not been
given enough quotas and some retired due to a high age, and thus
received welcomed “retirement money” when selling their quota
rights.
A general perceptionwas that the number of fishers will continue
to reduce as a consequence of the high average age among fishers,
the requirement to modernize the fleet and processing facilities, as
well as owing to the lack of political will to support fisheries. The
quota system was not believed to have any major impact on this
development. It was assumed that the trawling sector will further
concentrate into larger andmore profitable companies. Views of the
future for small-scale fisheries varied. Some saw a positive develop-
ment for fishers targeting quality fish: by forming larger units and
developing their own market segment, combined with an increas-
ing demand for fish products for human consumption, they would
secure their future.
“…there will most likely be three or four larger trap-net companies in
this area, who will own a larger share of the quotas and utilize seasonal
workers”—Interest group
Others considered the high average age among fishers, combined
with the lowprice for herring, and the problems faced due to the seal
and black cormorant populations, as obstacles to the continuation
of the small-scale sector.
Outcomes
 The herring catch has been more evenly distributed along the
season compared to the earlier system (Salmi et al., 2019).
 Stakeholders believed profits will rise. Short-term data sup-
ports this (Kärnä et al., 2020), but only time will reveal the ac-
curacy of this belief.
 Some small-scale fishers expressed their concerns regarding
the individual quotas limiting their operation owing to un-
fairness in both the quota distribution method and the system
favouring large-scale fishing.
 Nomarked changes in the fish price have been recorded at this
early stage (Salmi et al., 2019).
 The quota prices have remained at an “acceptable” level.
2. Quota and user right transfers (quota market)
The Finnish fleet for herring and sprat fisheries was considered
too large in relation to the catch to achieve (economic) sustainabil-
ity. This did not necessarily apply to the small-scale fishery sector,
where the average age of active fishers is considered high and new-
comers are few. Making the user rights and quotas transferable via
a quota market was seen as a necessity by the managers, as well as
by the majority of the stakeholders, as it would allow businesses to
grow and offer monetary compensation to those choosing to sell
their user rights, i.e. leave the fishery. There was, however, already
a negative trend in the number of registered fishers prior to the im-
plementation of the new system, and as such, opinions varied as to
what extent ITQs will support this trend.
Mechanisms
Most stakeholders considered the transferability of quotas as an
important property of the system. The option of transferring user
rights or renting quotas allows for better business planning and al-
lows actors to make rational decisions to enhance their economic
performance. Concerns existed that more and more quotas are be-
ing transferred to foreign owners. However, this development was
already visible before the introduction of the quota system. Risks
associated with buying more quotas were considered low, although
drastic changes in the TAC limit were acknowledged to impact on
the stability. However, some concerns were noted among trap-net
fishers, given that the seal and black cormorant populations will
continue to increase. If this development hinders the fishers from
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A common online market channel for selling and buying quotas
would, according to some actors, be a welcomed supplement, while
others saw no need for one, as the fisher community is small and
the current system of personally contacting each other was consid-
ered sufficient. Regarding the law limiting one actor from possess-
ing more than 20% of the national quotas, the common perception
was that it is good to have a limit. However, this limit was consid-
ered easily circumvented through strategic business planning.
“…it is possible to evade through strategic company structures, in which case
it does not matter what the percentage is.”—Interest group
Outcomes
 Most stakeholders hadwitnessed fishers leaving the occupation
after the implementation of the ITQ system, either due to re-
tirement or because of not having enough quotas. Preliminary
fisheries data supports this development (Salmi et al., 2019).
 Quota renting was appreciated among all stakeholders and,
compared to user right transfers, was more actively utilized
(Salmi et al., 2019).
 The system of “calling your fellow fishers” for quota trading
may weaken the flexibility and fairness of the programme. An
official quota trading platform was called for. This would also
enable the tracking of quota price developments.
3. Newcomer quotas
Context
The number of fishers, especially in the coastal small-scale fisheries,
has for a long time been in decline. A general perception among the
interviewed stakeholders was that the poor economic prospects and
large initial investments make it a difficult industry to enter. On top
of this, it was considered that the lifestyle of a fisher is not appealing
to the younger generations. Newcomer quotas were presented as a
solution to this problem.With the implementation of a new system
that enhances the economic prospects of the industry, and simul-
taneously keeps the door open for new fishers, managers hoped to
lure more actors into the industry.
Mechanisms
However, most of the interviewees considered the possibilities for
newcomers to enter the fishing industry as weak, pointing out that
the industry is not a profitable business to enter if starting from
scratch. It was considered too big of an investment for newcom-
ers to buy a vessel and all the equipment, and with the new system
in place, the eventual buying of quotas (after the “newcomer pe-
riod” ends) was now considered a further investment needed when
entering the industry. This suggests that the intended mechanisms
did not trigger due to the contextual factors. Stakeholders alsomen-
tioned a number of caseswhere existing fishers had applied for new-
comer quotas, e.g. by registering a family member as a “new” fisher.
This is a case of an unintended mechanism triggered by the new
system. A couple of stakeholders criticized the newcomer quotas
for only further reducing the existing fishers’ share of the TAC and
pointing out that the share allocated to newcomers actually ended
up being utilized by existing fishers “playing the system.”
Outcomes
 A total of 27 newcomers were registered in 2018 (Salmi et al.,
2019). Some of these may have been existing fishers who reg-
istered a family member as a new fisher.
 Luring newcomers into the industry did not work as antici-
pated.
4. Separate small- and large-scale user rights
Context
The interest in protecting small-scale coastal fisheries is naturally
advocated by the sector itself, but it is also prominent in the CFP.
The Finnish small-scale herring fishery is both socio-culturally and
economically important at the local and regional levels, although its
economic impact on a national scale is quite low compared to large-
scale fisheries. The different nature of the small-scale and large-
scale fishery sectors in Finland advocated the separation and con-
trol of transferability between them. To avoid a situation where all
user rights are held by large-scale fishers, i.e. trawlers, managers de-
cided that the two sectors will have separate non-transferable user
rights. Although the separation is considered important, different
views exist in the industry regarding whether the small-scale sector
actually wished for an individual quota system and to what extent
the sector was included in the planning of the new management
system.
Mechanisms
Themajority of the interviewees did not find anynotable differences
in the way the system treats large and small, or trawl and trap-net,
fishing companies. Comments were given that all follow the same
rules and laws, and thus have the same prerequisites for succeeding.
However, some concerns were expressed regarding trap-net fish-
ers not having the same opportunities to sell their quotas or user
rights, since active trap-net fishers are decreasing in number and
the capital for investing is often limited in smaller fishing compa-
nies. Transferability is an important property of the ITQ system,
and as such, the lack of quota transfer possibilities hinders the ex-
pected optimization of the fishery fleet. Some of the trap-net fish-
ers noted that the inequality occurred prior to the allocation, rather
than now when the system is up and running. This statement refers
to the fact thatmost interviewees had either experienced or heard of
instances where trawlers were maximizing their catch history prior
to the implementation.
“The fishing did not make any economic sense at times… they were only fish-
ing to maximize their catch history”—Commercial fisher
The general perception among trap-net fishers was that they
were not properly informed about the ITQ system, or them being
a part of the system, and as such were not given an opportunity to
affect their catch history in the same way as the trawlers did.
“…trap-net fishers did not know how it was planned, trawl fishers knew, and
they were able to manipulate their catch history…”—Commercial fisher
This apparently caused a lot of negative feelings and bitterness
among the trap-net fisher community.
The allocation of quotas based on the catch history was seen by
most interviewees as the right option, some of them adding that it
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“…donot believe a system thatwould be fair for everyonewill ever be found…
there will always be those who lose and those who win”—Commercial fisher
The interviewed scientist thought that the quotas should have
been divided through an auction, since fish is a natural resource
that belongs to everyone. The fishers targeting herring for human
consumption (three trap-net and one trawl fisher) were all unsatis-
fied with the quota allocation process. It was believed that the sys-
tem favoured large-scale fodder fishers e.g. they had seen how the
larger trawlers even fished in an uneconomical manner just tomax-
imize their catch history prior to the implementation. The small-
scale fishers, who according to some comments, initially were un-
aware of being included in the ITQ system, as well as whose catch
is limited by the short fishing period, was unable to maximize their
catch history in the same manner. One interviewee mentioned the
extra cost of now being forced to buy more quotas to be able to
fish the same amount as a few years back, acknowledging that the
national herring quota was drastically reduced simultaneously with
the implementation of the ITQ system, which naturally reduced the
quantity of fish the user rights cover.
Outcomes
 The separation of small- and large-scale fisheries, including the
limits for transferring user rights between them, is considered
a necessary property of the system.
 No agreement exists on the benefits of including small-scale
fisheries in the ITQ system.
 Concerns regarding the system’s functionality for small-scale
fishers are evident.
 The option for coastal fishers to rent their annual quota to
trawlers is a positive property of the system.
5. Social and environmental factors
Context
Although economic objectives were regarded as the primary objec-
tive of the ITQ system, social and environmental objectives were
also acknowledged. The TAC decisions taken on the EU level were
considered to ensure the sustainability of the fish stocks. Occupa-
tional safety aspects were believed to have been directly improved
through the ITQ system by allowing fishers to stay in port during
dangerousweather conditions, a decision not lightly taken in a race-
to-fish situation. Other social aspects were linked to the low prof-
itability of the industry and the unpredictable top-down manage-
ment. By limiting user rights to a definitive time period, managers
tried to reach a balance between controlling quota price escalation
and allowing a long-enough-time horizon for businesses to func-
tion.
Mechanisms
Limiting user rights to a period of 10+5 years was mostly viewed as
positive and a sufficient time span for business planningwithin fish-
ing companies. The new system was considered to create a secure
environment for businesses to operate. The fishers were concerned
about whether the ITQ system will continue after this time period.
Although the option of not continuing was seen as unlikely, confir-
mation of its continuity was wished for.
“If you apply an individual quota system, do it properly, why this in-between
model?”—Interest group
Equally, investments were also associated with the uncertainty of
the system’s future.
“If I invest money now in new quotas, what will happen after ten years, will
all the money be wasted?”—Commercial fisher
Some interviewees agreed with the positive impacts of ITQ on
fishers’ work safety, at least in theory, while others were not con-
vinced that any changes would be seen in practice. However, not
being forced to fish during the worst storms in fear of losing part
of the national quota, as well as the reduced stress caused by the
previous race-to-fish situation, was appreciated.
None of the interviewees considered the ITQ system to have an
impact on the sustainability of the fish stocks, since the TAC is still
decided on the basis of the same scientific evidence as before. Some
fishers expressed their disbelief in the stock assessments, as they
considered the stocks to be larger than what the scientific evidence
claims. Some also commented that during years with good catches,
the market is the factor limiting fishing, since both demand and the
processing capacity are insufficient.
Most interviewees agreed that it is best to have separate quotas
for the herring and sprat fisheries. The benefits of combining them
were seen in the main basin of the Baltic Sea, where the sprat quota
is often considered as a limiting factor when catching herring. One
participant commented on the recent introduction of a clause al-
lowing up to 9% of sprat caught as bycatch to be registered as her-
ring:
“to have different quotas has lost its meaning… Also allowing those who
had not previously fished sprat to start to do so…This was introduced after
the initial quota allocation, messing things up a bit”—Commercial fisher
Similarly, a couple of stakeholders stated that they were happy
with the introduction of ITQs, but that the managers should fully
commit to the system, stop intervening, and allow the system to ad-
just according to the markets, as it is supposed to do. This indicates
that constant changes in the system are partly perceived to alter the
stability of the industry, i.e. the stability for a company to operate.
A number of fishers mentioned an increase in surveillance when it
comes to controlling possible overfishing, an attribute considered
partly positive and partly to have increased the amount of “paper-
work” fishers need to spend time on.
The interviewees were sceptical about the idea of quota saving,
or bankable ITQs, as a method to fully or partly save quotas in re-
turn for an interest rate based on fish growth and stock reproduc-
tion. Most of them considered that a possibility for “quota saving”
would be a welcomed addition, but not for the intended purpose.
None considered the biological factors behind such a system as a
strong argument, but instead saw the advantages of it in improved
flexibility and business planning. For instance, in the case of a ves-
sel breakdown, the quotas could be saved for the next season. Some
of the stakeholders immediately dismissed such a system since, in
practice, it would not be possible to be combined with the current
system.
Outcome
 Reduced stress levels, safer fishing conditions, and the sense of
being able to manage one’s own business are the positive out-
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 The ITQ system is believed to create a better environment for
businesses to succeed.
 ITQs were not seen to have an impact on the sustainability of
fish stocks.
Refined theory
Based on the analysis of the collected data and the best available
knowledge, we here present an updated view of the Finnish ITQ
system. The primary aim of the ITQ system in Finland is to improve
the economic prospects of the fishing industry.However, the system
treats the large- and small-scale fisheries differently.
The ITQ system works as expected in the large-scale fisheries.
It has enabled a possibility for an increase in the economic per-
formance of this sector. ITQs allow fishing according to demand
and a prolonged fishing season. Thus, the system provides flexibil-
ity for fishers in operational and long-term planning. Quota trad-
ing provides a possibility for the fishers to increase their catches. As
a market-based system, the ITQ favours larger and more efficient
actors, which may imply that the user rights concentrate to fewer
actors.
The ITQ systemmay not reach its full potential in the small-scale
fisheries sector. On the contrary, it may reduce the viability of this
sector. Small-scale fishers often lack the financial resources to ac-
quire further quotas, which decreases their possibilities to increase
business. This may lead to imbalance in quota trading between
small- and large-scale fishers. ITQ is not a solution to the problemof
the ageing of the fisher community. Although the Finnish ITQ sys-
tem, in theory, allows newcomers to enter the system and replace
retired fishers, this is difficult in practice owing to the high invest-
ments needed. The costs to the small-scale fisheries caused by seals
and black cormorants further worsen their economic situation.
In general, the ITQ system enables an even distribution of
catches over the season. It allows fishers to better control their own
businesses, which reduces their stress levels. The system can even
improve occupational safety aspects, as it allows fishers to stay in
port during dangerous weather conditions. Both quota renting and
user right transfers have shown its benefits. For the transactions, an
official quota trading platform could be useful. It would also allow
tracking of the development of quota prices. Enhancing the prof-
itability of larger fishing companies and removing the less efficient
actors is a key element of the ITQ system. This will further reduce
the number of fishers in Finland. The fairness of the system can be
questioned from the perspective of small-scale fishers and the via-
bility of coastal communities.
Discussion
To what extent the new management system has been a success
largely depends on the perspective. The primary objective of im-
plementing the quota system in the Finnish herring and sprat fish-
eries was to improve the economic efficiency of the industry. From
this perspective, the ITQ system could be considered a success in
its early stages, particularly within the trawl fishery sector.However,
the actual outcomes within the small-scale fishery sector have led to
weaker prospects. In the planning phase, Finland utilized both the-
oretical knowledge and practical experiences from countries utiliz-
ing similar management systems. The perceived unfairness of the
system’s implementation as well as its functionality in the small-
scale fishery sector remains one of the largest reasons for dissatisfac-
tion. A fundamental question is whether these less-favourable out-
comes of the Finnish quota system are a consequence of inadequate
planning or the nature of the ITQ system. By allocating a separate
quota for small-scale fishers, Finland managed to circumvent the
common critique of ITQs that decreasing fleet overcapitalization is
often done at the expense of small-scale fishers (Eythórsson, 2000;
Stewart et al., 2006). However, our results indicate that the contin-
uation of the small-scale fishery sector is also dependent on other
factors, such as seal population developments and fish product de-
mand, that are not directly linked to the quota system. There are to-
day several institutions and organisations that recognize small-scale
fisheries as a separate sector in their guidelines, highlighting their
importance for achieving sustainable fisheries (European Commis-
sion, 2016; Cohen et al., 2019; FAO, 2019; Said and Chuenpagdee,
2019). Considering this, we believe that future studies should focus
on recognizing the causal mechanisms of an individual quota sys-
tem for small-scale coastal fisheries, as the sector does not neces-
sarily operate under the same mechanisms as the large-scale sector.
In this study, we applied the RE method to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the ITQ-based management of the herring fishery in Fin-
land. The outcomes of the Finnish quota system have followed a
similar pattern as in other Baltic Sea fisheries: reduced fleet capac-
ity and enhanced overall profitability (Blomquist and Waldo, 2018;
Bonow, 2018; Merayo et al., 2018). However, common across these
fisheries is also the uneven distribution of profitability between
small- and large-scale fishers. Nevertheless, it needs to be pointed
out that the negative impacts cannot be fully explained by the quota
system, but rather are a combination of many contextual factors, as
mentioned above. Ultimately, each fishery is unique, with its own
contextual properties and causal mechanisms. As earlier case stud-
ies indicate (Dewees, 1998; Asche et al., 2014), it takes some years of
turbulence before the fishery fleet, and the industry, enters a more
stable form after the implementation of the ITQ system. Thus, the
long-term economic, social, and environmental outcomes of the
Finnish ITQ system are yet to be seen. Long-term results will also
allow discussion of the opportunity costs from the decision taken
to divide quotas based on catch history, and not through an auction
as the interviewed scientist had preferred.
In Finland, trap-net fishers predominantly fish in private wa-
ters that they either own by themselves or rent from the water area
owner. This means that, in principle, individual quotas limit the
right of these fishers to fish in their own or rented waters. These
fishers were also subjected to regulations under the previous man-
agement form, which restricted the utilization of the national quota
mainly through time- and area-based measures. Finnish law stipu-
lates that fish stocks, as a resource, are owned by the state, thus indi-
cating that owning waters is not equivalent to owning the resources
in the water. However, fishers are able to restrict other fishers from
fishing in their waters. To what extent this “double ownership” was
contemplated in the planning phase, and to what extent the ITQ
system is affected by it, is an interesting question. For a newcomer
entering the small-scale fishing sector, this may imply even more
investments if the person is not only forced to buy or lease quotas,
but also the right to fish in private waters.
RE offers a comprehensive evaluation process, and much like
the ex-ante evaluation approach SIA, RE advocates stakeholder in-
volvement as well as utilizing a variety of data collection meth-
ods. Hilborn et al. (2020) discuss the importance of understand-
ing “what methods of management have worked in what social, eco-
nomic, political, and biological contexts,” and based on that, how the
most appropriatemanagement systems should be implemented.We
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understanding of the changes brought about by an intervention in
relation to the context. RE does not offer the definitive truth re-
garding whether an intervention worked, but rather offers policy-
makers an explanation of “what works for whom in what cir-
cumstances and in what respect, and how.” As an ex-post eval-
uation tool, it can be used across different sectors in marine
and coastal management, identifying causal mechanisms for both
single-sector and cross-sectoral cumulative IAs. There are nonethe-
less some challenges in utilizing this method. First, changes in
complex social systems take place at many levels, where people
and organizations are all influenced by multiple internal and ex-
ternal pressures. Evaluating these multi-causalities is challenging
and one needs to accept that there are rarely any simple expla-
nations. The researcher not only needs to find the casual rela-
tionships within the system, but also link them to the initial pro-
gramme theory. Navigating through this requires stakeholder en-
gagement as well as drawing conclusions from other information
sources. Second, CMO configurations are a powerful frame for
explaining causal mechanisms, but they also present challenges
in recognizing and separating which outcomes of an intervention
are theory driven and which are context driven, i.e. to what de-
gree the changes are due to the intervention itself or to the con-
textual factors triggering changes. Herein, lies the complexity of
identifying mechanisms. Third, RE requires considerable exper-
tise on the subject, as well as time and resources. Nonetheless,
RE has the potential to provide highly valuable information for
policymakers.
Conclusion
 Finland appears to have followed a rather typical direction for
fisheries globally where ITQs have been utilized. The system
enables efficient and/or financially stable companies to flour-
ish, enhances the profitability of the industry, and reduces the
overcapacity of the fishery fleet. Meanwhile, less attractive im-
pacts occur among small-scale coastal fisheries, which affects
rural communities and factors broadly perceived as the social
inequities of ITQs.
 The Finnish herring and sprat fishery industry will most likely
go through a few years ofmore turbulent changes before reach-
ing a more stable form. In the continuation, a special focus
needs to be placed on the small-scale fishery sector, securing
its future and profitability.
 RE is an appropriate method for the ex-post evaluation of
fisheries management systems. It offers a comprehensive ap-
proach that analyses outcomes in relation to the contextual fac-
tors, contributing to the development of the initial program
theory.
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